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    This paper presents a complete design and implementation of a Single Event Upset (SEU) emulation system that can 
be used to inject faults in Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) based Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). The 
FPGA is used to implement an avionics system for a small satellite. The fault injector emulates the expected Single Event 
Upset (SEU) rate as it would be in the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) of the polar orbiting satellites at inclinations close to 98° 
deg., and altitude of about 670 km. The emulator injects faults in the configuration bit-stream of the FPGA without 
stopping its operation. It makes use of the partial reconfiguration feature of today’s FPGAs. This provides a facility to 
assess the design performance in space even if radiation testing will not be conducted before launching. Also, it simulates 
the expected upset rate and hence calculates the corresponding data failure rates for Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) 
fault tolerant designs. The system was implemented using the Xilinx Virtex- LX50T FPGA. The FPGA suffered system 
failures during the fault injection test. It recovered about 50% of the failures. TMR simulation at an upset rate of 0.1 upsets 
(per bit per second) for a data size of 2048 bits showed that about 33% of the faults will be fully corrected.  
 




1.  Introduction 
 
  Design of fault tolerant systems for space applications uses 
redundancy in implementation. Redundancy can be in 
software code, hardware units, and time of execution and data 
bits. The protection techniques can be used individually or 
concatenated. They add to the improvement of the system 
capability in detecting and correcting faults hence increasing 
its reliability, however, they also add overhead. 
  It is often required to assess the reliability of fault tolerant 
systems in operating conditions close to the environment 
where they will be used. Satellites are tested in electrical, 
thermal vacuum, mechanical and radiation conditions as close 
as possible to the target orbit.  
  Radiation testing at proton accelerators is expensive, not 
readily available and needs complicated setups. The purpose 
of radiation testing is to evaluate how the design will perform 
in the space radiation environment. The common tests include 
Single Event Upsets (SEE) and Total Ionization Dose (TID). 
The Single Event Upset (SEU) is part of the SEE where the 
logic values of the bits stored in the processor registers and 
memory cells are altered. This might lead to malfunctions and 
inappropriate operations. In SRAM-based FPGAs, where the 
design is stored in the internal SRAM after being loaded from 
the boot-up flash, bit alteration due to SEU can be severe. It 
might lead to changing the functioning logic and complete 
failure of the system. 
  This paper emulates and simulates the effects of SEUs as 
they would be found in LEO orbits at an altitude of 
approximately  670 km and inclination of about 98° deg. The 
purpose is to develop a complete LEO SEU radiation 
environment emulator that can be used in fault injection in 
SRAM-based FPGA avionic systems designs. We hope that 
this work would save the proton accelerator tests and provide 
simple and confident test techniques. 
  In the following sections the paper introduces the SEU fault 
injection concept in section 2, the SEU fault injector is 
presented in section 3, the emulation results and discussion are 
presented in section 4, and the conclusion and future work are 
presented in section 5.    
 
2.  SEU Fault Injection Concept 
 
  Fault injection in functioning systems is a technique used to 
insert deliberate faults at selected and/or random units of the 
design to assess its sensitivities. This technique is 
implemented by adding additional hardware and software to 
the system to handle the insertion of faults, monitoring of 
performance and collection of results. Figure 1, shows the 
architecture of a fault injection system.  
   The design under test is interfaced to a faults insertion unit 
which has access to the design units where faults are to be 
injected. The faults vector calculation and generation unit 
prepares faults vectors that match the required test objectives. 
The fault insertion unit can be a combination of hardware and 
software. It handles the overriding of the normal operation 
into a faulty one. For example, the fault insertion unit can be a 
code that reads back a previously calculated value by the 
normal DUT code and then overwrites with a faulty value to 
simulate a specific condition. The insertion can be done 
without stopping the main operation. In some designs it might 
be inevitable to interrupt the normal operation flow by 
suspending it and then resuming after the injection takes place. 
The function monitoring and control unit takes care of 
monitoring the operation of the DUT. It stops the DUT 
operation in case of noticing an emergency and provides a 




operation settings. The performance of the DUT is statistically 
analyzed to detect anomalies in normal operation as faults are 
injected. The feedback about how the DUT behaves while in 
fault injection mode is provided to the faults vector calculation 
and generation unit. It uses that information in generating new 
fault vectors. For example, the feedback statistical information 
might show that there is a repetitive pattern in the output when 
certain fault sequence is followed. The faults vector 
generation and calculation unit might repeat the vectors with 
different variations to study the statistical dependence between 
injected faults and output vectors. Fault monitoring and 
control unit also feedback the faults vector calculation and 
generation with information about the behavior of the DUT 
during the fault injection process. For example, it might be 
necessary to feedback the faults vector calculation and 
generation unit with the moments where the system 
completely stopped working and needed a deep reset. This 
information can be used in detecting the types of faults that 
lead to total failure. 










Fig. 1.  Fault injection cycle. The faults are injected to the DUT and 
statistical results are issued as a feedback to the injecting machine for test 
vectors adjustment. 
 
  The SEUs which occur in space are probabilistic. Poisson 
distribution is used to estimate the expected number of upsets (k) 
which happens in the time interval (T) with an average number of 
upsets (μ) according to the probability density function shown in 
Eq. (1) [1][2]. The exponential distribution is used to estimate the 
expected time between upsets (τ) with an average number of 
upsets in unit time interval (λ) as shown in Eq. (2). The 
relationship between both distributions can be set as (μ = λT). 
 
                   (1.) 
              (2.) 
 
  The SEU rate can be estimated using the Cosmic Ray Effects 
on Micro Electronics (CREME) model [3]. The Space 
Environment Simulator web tool [4] is used to draw the 
estimations [4]. Figure 2, shows the SEU estimation for a 670 km 
with an inclination of 98° deg. The peaks in the figure are related 
to upsets taking place at the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA). The 
upset rate estimation is based on the values of the radiation testing 
of the Xilinx Virtex 5 LX50 FPGA [5-8]. Fault Injection rate is 
estimated by using the per bit upset rate from the SPENVIS 
simulation shown in Figure 2. Faults are injected to the FPGA 


















Fig. 2.  SEU rate during 1 day of flight. The peaks are orbital positions 
corresponding to the South Atlantic Anomaly. 
 
3.  SEU Fault Injector 
 
  The fault Injector that is used during the test setup is shown 
in Figure 3. The injector uses an internal hardware unit that 
can reconfigure the FPGA bit stream, the SEU controller. It is 
an IP core that is provided by Xilinx which can be controlled 
from outside the FPGA to produce faults in the form of bit 
flipping in the FPGA configuration frame. The control of the 
SEU controller is through serial communication over the 
RS232 channel to send commands to it and receive response . 
  The fault injector system contains 3 external computers to 
support its function. The fault injector computer which runs 
MATLAB script to generate random faults based on the 
Poisson distribution of the SEUs in the target orbit. It 
generates the timing at which faults will be injected which 
follows the exponential distribution as described earlier.  
  Another computer is used for configuring the FPGA with 
the bit-stream which contains the hardware design. The design 
that is being used here consists of four cores of the Microblaze 
processor which runs together to form the avionics system of a 
small satellite. The cores exchange data with each other 
through the Fast Simplex Link (FSL) bus. This a peer to peer 
direct communication between the Microblaze processors.  
  The function monitoring of the processors is done through 
sending the processors status and results of executing a simple 
counter program to the UART interfaces which are monitored 
by an external computer to collect the results and analyze 
them. The system runs the simulation for number of times and 
it generates a new fault injection vector at each time. the fault 
injection vector contains the bit location that will be flipped 
which is a random number from (0 t0 1311) and the frame 
number where flipping will take place which is a random 
number from (1 to 8662). The faults are accumulated and their 
effects are watched as they are injected. At the end of the 
injection cycle an auto correction mode is enabled to recover 
the injected faults and restore the operation of the cores. The 
flow chart in Figure 4, shows the test flow. The detection 





















































Fig. 3.  SEU Fault Injector Setup. 
 
 








































































































































Fig. 4.  Test flow Setup. The faults are injected using the commands over 
serial interface with the SEU controller. The results are collected over the 
serial interface with the processors cores. The auto-correction mode is 
enabled at the end of operation to recover all the injected faults. 
 
4.  The emulation Results and Discussion 
 
  The results of running the simulation for 10 times in two 
sizes of batches: 50 accumulated errors and 100 accumulated 














Fig. 5.  Fault Injection Results. 
 
  Three types of correction can take place: the full 
reconfiguration, the partial reconfiguration and the Software 
resynchronization. The full reconfiguration is the mode where 
the FPGA stopped working due to fault injections. The entire 
bit-stream of the design should be reloaded to the internal 
SRAM in order to restore the correct operation. The partial 
reconfiguration is the mode where one or more processor 
stopped working but not the whole system. The system can be 
partially reconfigured without stopping the other processors to 
restore the operation. The Software resynchronization is the 
mode where the software of the working processors need to be 
resynchronized to the same operation after one or more 
processors stop working and then resumes again. 
  The results show that about 10% of the injected faults in the 
50 faults batch and 10% of the 100 faults batch needed full 
reconfiguration. Another 10% of the faults in the 50 faults 
batch needed partial reconfiguration while 30% of the faults 
injected in the 100 faults batch needed partial reconfiguration. 
This means that in the 50 faults batch, only 80% of the 
injected faults where totally recovered through the 
auto-correction mode without the need for partial or full 
reconfiguration. In the case of the 100 faults batch, 60% of the 
injected faults were fully recovered with no need of any 
reconfiguration. The software resynchronization takes place 
whenever a partial reconfiguration is initiated or a processor 
stops operation then resumes after the auto-correction mode 
has been enabled.  
  Figure 6-8, shows the results of applying the fault injection 
over a packet size of 2048 bits in a TMR operation. The 
packet contained a random vector of data and the vector is 
compared between three of the operating cores after faults 
were injected randomly in it. The vectors are compared value 
by value in an TMR operation through a voter in the fourth 
processor. The results shown in figure 6, are the log plot for 
the different upset rates versus the residual failures. This is the 
condition where the data from the three processors is 
indifferent and no consensus can be found among it or it is 
similar but still incorrect.
 
Seed setting of the random 




Random Generation of Frame 
number (1 to 8662)
Calculation of Hex Frame 
Address
Random Generation of Bit 
number (Hex) to be flipped
Sending `*` command to start 
UART control mode
Sending `d` command for 
Detection Only Mode
Injecting Fault Through by 
sending a string
`t-frame address-bit no`
Send `a` command to start 
Auto Correction Mode





































Fig. 6.  Log plot of the residual failure versus the upset rate. The residual failures are the failures which still remain in the data even after being corrected 
or the failures that can not be corrected at all. Failures can still be remaining in the data even after correction when the faults are injected in the same bit 



























































Fig. 8.  Histogram of the residual failures after applying the TMR voting and correction procedure. 
 
  
5.  Conclusion and Future Work 
  This paper presented a fault injection emulator that can be 
used for injecting random faults in the FPGA bit-stream to 
simulate the effects of the space environment. About 10% of 
the injected faults in the hardware bit-stream needed full 
reconfiguration. In the case of data fault injection at an upset 
rate of 0.1 upsets per bits per second, more than 50% of the 
data will have residual failures. We recommend to study the 
effects of faults injection on many fault tolerant designs to 
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